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Political Correctness, the Law,
and the Legal Academy
Mark Tushnet*
The spring squall of 1991 about political correctness on campus has
passed, leaving behind a muddy residue in the nation's political rhetoric. I
Although the squall initially may have seemed to develop from a
detached interest in campus developments,2 it rapidly became clear that
the campaign against "political correctness" was this year's version of
conservative concern about liberalism in the universities.3 The timely
publication of Dinesh D'Souza's Illiberal Education, and D'Souza's
understandable efforts to promote the book's sales by publishing op-ed
articles and appearing on news programs,4 offered a continuing news-
hook for stories about political correctness. Conservatives took up the
attack on political correctness, until it worked its way into President
Bush's commencement speech at the University of Michigan.5
Predictably, the conservative appropriation of the attack on political
correctness has obscured more than it has clarified. I intend this essay
mostly to lay out precisely what ought to be at issue. Given the con-
servative domination of the discourse, much of what follows attempts to
show how overblown or distorted the conservative characterization of
the issue is. I draw upon my experience as an academic in a law school,
and therefore focus on some incidents in the literature on political cor-
* I would like to thank Max Holland for his comments on a very early version of this essay, and
Elizabeth Alexander, Mike Seidman, and Robin West for their comments on later versions.
1. I asked the Georgetown University Law Library to monitor articles in NEXIS on political
correctness from early 1991 to the present. In spring 1991 there were a number of substantial
discussions; since then the search picks up an occasional editorial, op-ed piece, or letter (along with
speeches by the leadership of the People's Republic of China and their allies).
2. For a relatively early article representative of this approach, see Adler et al, Taking Offense,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48.
3. The prior year's version was Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, which, as I
argue below, makes what is in many ways precisely the opposite challenge to what it presents as
liberal orthodoxy.
4. I want to be clear that, although I disagree with D'Souza, I find nothing objectionable in his
efforts at self-promotion. I know that it is difficult to make a living as a writer, and anyone trying to
do so is surely entitled to try to maximize sales.
5. William Neikirk, Bush on Diversity: His Critics Fear a Harder Line on Civil Rights, CHI.
TRIB., May 12, 1991, at 4:1 (discussing President Bush's May 4 speech).
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rectness that arose in law schools, although I will also bring in other
incidents as appropriate.
The first section of the essay shows how little a casual reader of news
accounts would know about what actually has happened. The second
argues that the attack on political correctness simply overlooks serious
issues of pedagogy when it criticizes challenges to insensitive classroom
presentations as "PC" without considering whether the presentations
were pedagogically sound. Because the language of academic freedom
and free speech has been tossed around in these discussions, the third
section tries to slice up the problem to see exactly where serious ques-
tions of academic freedom might be raised; I argue that critics of political
correctness have actually identified only a handful of such questions.
Despite the fact that the attack on political correctness has been wildly
overstated, there may be a problem associated with political correctness,
defined as the enforcement, in some sense, of politically-derived stan-
dards of scholarship. The final section attempts to identify what that
problem is. In brief, I argue that the fundamental problem occurs when
academic administrators, lacking a vision of what a university should be,
bend to whatever wind happens to be blowing the strongest. Under these
circumstances, it seems likely that there has been little change recently in
the number of departures from the vision of the university as the locale
for disinterested scholarly inquiry, although perhaps there have been
more departures leftward than there used to be.6 If we really want to
make universities places where disinterested scholarly inquiry occurs,
though, we have to look at administrators, not faculty or students. Ironi-
cally, the attack on political correctness may exacerbate the difficulty
because academic administrators will treat the conservative challengers
of "PC" as just another interest group to be satisfied, another wind to
bend to.
I. QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE
The ordinary reader of newspapers and popular magazines has
received a distorted account of what has been happening on campuses.
One distortion, which I mention here only to relegate to footnotes hereaf-
ter, is that the rhetoric about political correctness is triggered solely by
what are presented as efforts by liberals to "enforce" their views against
conservatives. There is, however, a parallel phenomenon of conservative
"enforcement" against liberals, feminists, and others. California State
University at Long Beach, for example, paid $110,000 to settle a suit by
six former faculty members in the university's Women's Studies program
who alleged that "campus administrators joined followers of the con-
servative activist Phyllis Schlafly in 1982 to 'purge' the program of what
6. Which is not to say that there have been fewer departures rightward.
[VCol. 4: 127
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its critics saw as 'Marxist and lesbian indoctrination' of students."7 In
the law schools, Richard Abel offers an "incomplete list" of twelve peo-
ple associated with critical legal studies who "suffered adverse personnel
decisions-denials of tenure, contract terminations, and reversals of lat-
eral appointments voted by faculty."' A full consideration of the prob-
lem of political correctness ought to take these incidents, and other
similar ones, into account.
To avoid grievance collecting and a fruitless discussion of comparative
victimization, though, I will try to take the challenge to political correct-
ness on its own terms. There is, however, yet another difficulty. Pinning
down the evidence of political correctness is extraordinarily difficult.
Reporting of incidents is woefully incomplete, at least from the point of
view of one familiar with how universities operate. The accounts have
gaps that a serious reporter would have tried to fill.
A. Political Correctness as an Urban Legend
Many of the stories about political correctness resemble what folklor-
ists have called "urban legends." Undoubtedly something happened, but
the newspaper reader would be well-advised to be cautious about draw-
ing any conclusions from the news accounts. Drawing upon some addi-
tional library research and my knowledge of how universities operate, I
will offer alternative accounts of the events, consistent with what has
been reported and, in my judgment, more likely to describe what really
happened.
Journalism's demands provide one reason for the inadequacy of the
reporting. Reporters want a "hot lede," which grabs the reader's atten-
tion. But, it is hard to convey nuance and detail in a "hot lede." The
simplified version that the reporter presents then becomes the basis for
the event's entry into the canon of political correctness stories.9 Even
7. Faculty Notes, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 26, 1991, at A12. The University
did not admit wrongdoing, and one might arguably treat the firings as bending to the wind in 1982
and the settlement as bending to the wind, which had shifted direction, in 1991. For another
example, see Laura A. Kiernan, Sturnick" Tough Enough to Weather the Storm, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 26, 1991, New Hampshire Weekly, at 1 (Republican Governor Gregg of New Hampshire and
the conservative newspaper demanded firing of state college president who moved religious
baccalaureate ceremony off campus.) After Professor Anita Hill testified in hearings on the
nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, a state legislator wrote the president of the
University of Oklahoma that "this 'Left-Wing Extremist' " should be fired. Ways & Means,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Oct. 23, 1991, at A23. I do not recall seeing the term
"political correctness" being used in connection with that letter.
8. Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 40 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 407, 410 and n.17 (1990). Professor Abel's thesis is that these personnel decisions
were based on these people's association with critical legal studies. The last category is particularly
important, given my later focus on the case of Ian Macneil, where D'Souza takes political
correctness as the reason why Macneil's lateral appointment was not taken up by the Harvard Law
School faculty.
9. A very nice, self-conscious example of the use of a "hot lede," precisely to make the point in
the text, is Ken Fireman, 'Political Correctness' In Dispute, NEWSDAY, May 12, 1991, at 34,
discussed in more detail below, text accompanying note 35.
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more important, virtually everyone who has participated in events
reported the next day in the newspapers knows that the stories almost
inevitably get some of the more significant details wrong even when they
get the basic outlines of the story right. Where, as I argue is the case
with political correctness, the more important phenomena are revealed
by the details rather than by the broad outlines, newspaper accounts will
fall short of what one needs to understand the events.
Finally, most reporting on political correctness has been inadequate
even by ordinary journalistic standards. Stories rely on accounts pro-
vided by those who believe themselves victimized by political correctness,
and rarely acknowledge that these sources have a variety of understanda-
ble biases that a reader ought to take into account. When the reports
draw on interviews with those on the other side of the controversy, the
structure of the presentation-victim's account, taken to be presump-
tively correct, followed by opponent's account, asserting that the events
were more complicated (and thereby not overcoming the presumption)--
leaves the victim's account standing.
A good example is an op-ed article published on July 29, 1991, in the
Christian Science Monitor, a reputable newspaper ordinarily careful
about getting facts straight. The article is a skeptical look at the attack
on political correctness. To establish that he takes the attack seriously,
the author acknowledges that "there have been cases like essayist
Edward Hoagland denied tenure at Bennington College because he was
supposedly homophobic (which he does not seem to be)."'" This is a
false statement of fact.
On June 15, Hoagland published an op-ed article in the New York
Times." He reported that the English department at Bennington first
voted to renew his contract and then reversed that decision. 12 The first
thing to note is that Hoagland describes the department's initial decision
as one to "rehire" him. Hoagland, like many writers, appears to have
had a renewable non-tenure track contract as something like a writer-in-
residence at Bennington,13 an arrangement that freed him from some of
10. Keith C. Burris, Conformity's Newest Guise, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 29, 1991,
at 18.
11. Edward Hoagland, Fear and Learning in Vermont, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 1991, at A23.
12. Hoagland had published an essay in Esquire magazine on "the current literary scene" in
which he commented on the AIDS epidemic, saying that:
the disease had spread with faxlike speed 'because of a gale of often icy promiscuity' enjoyed
through an orifice animals had all but stopped using sexually when the cloaca was abandoned
70 million to 100 million years ago. As a nature writer, I argued that anal sex is dangerous
because it's not provided for physiologically, not because it is morally wrong.
Id. In my view, it is not unreasonable to call this "homophobic," although I probably would not. It
is, I think, a clearly callous way of making a point, and therefore some evidence of unfitness for a
candidate for appointment to a faculty at a college at which some students are homosexual. For a
more complete discussion of the pedagogical issues implicit in the preceding statement, see Part II
infra.
13. The entry for Hoagland in Who's Who is consistent with this inference. Its relevant part
reads: "Mem. faculty New Sch. for Social Research, N.Y.C., 1963-64, Rutgers (N.J.) U., 1966,
[Vol. 4: 127
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the ordinary obligations of full-faculty status while providing him with
some financial security. He describes the nonrenewal as being fired. If
Bennington's usual practice has been to rehire people in such positions as
many times as they want, that description is accurate. Calling the nonre-
newal a tenure denial, however, is not.
The second and more important point is that when Hoagland's article
was published, a month before the Christian Science Monitor article,
Hoagland had in fact been rehired. Hoagland's article ended by noting
that he had appealed his case to the college's Personnel Review Commit-
tee. According to Bennington's president, "before the article appeared
... [the committee] concluded that an injustice had been done and rec-
ommended that it be remedied." The college, again according to its pres-
ident, "acted promptly and decisively... by deciding to offer him the
position for which he had been a candidate."' 4
The Christian Science Monitor's off-hand summary of the Hoagland
episode is unfortunately typical of the reporting on political correctness.
Its most characteristic feature, in fact, is that it relies on no reporting
whatsoever. The victim's account of the incident is the only source of
evidence. The reports never note that victims have a perfectly under-
standable desire to present what happened to them in a way that makes
them appear best. When the reports are offered by people with a political
ax to grind, one can fairly wonder exactly what happened. The proper
conclusion, I think, is that accounts offered by politically interested peo-
ple drawn almost entirely from the victim's side of the story almost cer-
tainly overstate the extent to which something called political correctness
came into play.
B. D'Souza and Macneil as Sources
I use an incident involving Harvard Law School reported, if that is the
word, by Dinesh D'Souza, as the vehicle for a more detailed analysis.
D'Souza's political orientation is clear. He began his career in journal-
ism as the editor of the controversial Dartmouth Review. According to a
profile in the Washington Post, there was "an old joke on his name-
'Distort D'Newsa.' 0,1s
In a favorable review of D'Souza's book, C. Vann Woodward says of
D'Souza's "accuracy of reporting" that D'Souza "occasional[ly]
stretch[es] evidence and logic to score a point" and provides "fairly
Sarah Lawrence Coll., Bronxville, N.Y., 1967, 1971, CUNY, 1967, 68, U.Iowa, 1978, 82, Columbia
U., 1980, 81; with Bennington Coll. Vt., 1987, 88, 89, Brown U., 1988, U.Calif., Davis, 1990-."
14. Elizabeth Coleman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1991, at A24. I must note, of
course, that it remains possible that the college knew that Hoagland's article was about to appear
and acted as promptly and decisively as it did precisely to allow the president to be able to write such
a letter.
15. Charles Trueheart, Big Man Off Campus, WASHINGTON POST, April 19, 1991, at B4. I
should note that, in the present context, it is not entirely clear whether I ought to quote this "joke."
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detailed, if sometimes very selective" documentation. 6 This demon-
strates Woodward's generosity of character. In describing the debate at
Stanford over revising its "Western culture" requirement, D'Souza
states that a "sparsely attended" faculty meeting voted to replace a
" 'great books' curriculum" with a new program. The former director of
the Stanford News Service has written, "Perhaps [D'Souza] confuses
Stanford with St. John's College," because there was no previous "great
books" curriculum. Further, the director said, the faculty meeting "was
filled to overflowing," with 51 of 55 voting representatives attending.17
D'Souza devotes a little over two pages to the incident I examine. 8 In
1989 Ian Macneil of the Northwestern University Law School was Rob-
ert Braucher Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard. In late March the
Harvard Women's Law Association published an "open letter," with
copies specifically distributed to "five top administrators, including the
dean," criticizing Macneil for "repeated instances of sexism." Macneil
responded with his own letter to the Harvard Women's Law Association.
What can a reader of D'Souza and Macneil find out about what hap-
pened? Less than one needs to evaluate the incident's implications for
political correctness. D'Souza relies on the published letters and, appar-
ently, an interview with Macneil; there is no evidence in his book that he
attempted to discuss the incident with representatives of the HWLA or
the Law School administration.
I begin at the end of the story. According to D'Souza, Macneil was
"bitter" and "chose[ ] not to seek an extention [sic] of his teaching
appointment but to move on to Northwestern University School of
Law." This sentence ought to set off bells of suspicion to one familiar
with elite law school hiring practices. These schools tend to distinguish
sharply, and relatively explicitly in their negotiations with visitors,
between "look-over" visits, that is, those in contemplation of a perma-
nent position, and other visits, typically to fill temporary curricular
needs. D'Souza hints, without ever quite saying, that Macneil did not
receive an appointment because of the controversy. Macneil is more cau-
tious, writing that he "very much doubt[s] that Harvard ever intended"
to offer him a permanent position, "but if it had, I am quite sure that the
16. C. Vann Woodward, Freedom and the Universities, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July
18, 1991, at 32.
17. Beyers, Machiavelli Loses Ground at Stanford, Bible Holds Its Own, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, June 19, 1991, at B2. For additional challenges to D'Souza's reporting, see Jon
Wiener, What Happened at Harvard, NATION, Sept. 30, 1991, at 384; Maurice Isserman, Travels
with Dinesh, TIKKUN, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 81, 83-84; George M. Fredrickson, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 26, 1991, at 74; Gene H. Bell-Villada, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. REV.
BooKS, Sept. 26, 1991, at 75. In response to the last item, Professor Woodward stated that he "was
wrong. . . -another score as well against Mr. D'Souza." C. Vann Woodward, Reply, N.Y. REV.
BooKS, Sept. 26, 1991, at 76. At this point, I believe that one would go seriously wrong in relying
solely on D'Souza as a source of information about events on which he reports.
18. DINESH D'SouZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 197-99 (1991). In my account I also rely on
Macneil's detailed Letter to the Editor, COMMENTARY, March 1990, at 10, 11.
[Vol. 4:127
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very making of such charges would have rapidly changed its mind, not
out of principle, but out of a desire to avoid controversy." Macneil was,
after all, the Braucher Visiting Professor, which suggests that he was
holding a position designed for one-year appointments. Lateral appoint-
ments to the Harvard Law School faculty are relatively unusual, 9 and
the word "Visiting" in the title suggests, as Macneil indicates, that
Harvard did not intend to consider him for a permanent position.2'
Suppose, then, that the HWLA letter had no immediate consequences
for Macneil's career.21 What are we to make of the incident? According
to D'Souza, it placed Macneil's reputation "on the line," and, "because
of the nature of the charges, their gravity, and their essential unanswer-
ability, Macneil . .. felt that 'I could not really clear myself.' "22 The
charges were indeed grave; the HWLA letter said that Macneil expressed
sexist attitudes and failed to take women's concerns seriously. The sense
in which they are unanswerable, though, is puzzling. Macneil might
have defended himself by saying that he did not make the comments;
that surely would be an answer. Or he might have defended himself, as
he did, by saying that the comments were not really sexist. If persuasive,
that too would be an answer. The problem, as I will argue briefly below
and more extensively in the next section, is that Macneil's claim that he
was not sexist was unpersuasive. It is not so much that the charges were
grave and unanswerable as that they were grave and unanswered, even by
Macneil.
Macneil suggested that there was another problem with the charges.
About two weeks after the HWLA letter was distributed, Macneil replied
with his own.23 Not only were they wrong on the merits, he wrote, but
he
had been convicted of an offense without a hearing, indeed without
19. Working with the 1990-91 AALS Directory of Law Teachers, I conclude that since 1985
Harvard Law School has made three lateral appointments (Mary Ann Glendon in 1986, after a visit
in 1974-75, Reinier Krpakman in 1987, after a visit in 1986-87, and William Afford in 1990, after a
visit in 1988-89). In my judgment, the two most recent lateral appointments are special cases
(because Professor Kraakman was hired from Yale Law School and because Professor Afford
specializes in Pacific Rim law).
20. It is hard to avoid some psychological speculation here. Harvard being what it is in the
academic hierarchy, I suspect that, despite whatever official signals Macneil got, in his heart of
hearts he would have liked to get an offer of a permanent position even if he did not want to stay at
Harvard. (Receiving such an offer has obvious psychological attractions, and it could be used in
bargaining with one's home institution.) By March, when the incident erupted, I suspect that he
would have had to be close to reconciling himself to the fact that he was not going to get such an
offer. Attributing that fact to the incident rather than to Harvard's judgment on the merits is
obviously psychologically attractive.
21. It might have long-term consequences, if Macneil gets a reputation as a sexist because of the
incident. My sense of the legal academic community is that that has not happened yet. It is also my
sense, based on the analysis of Macneil's response I provide in Part II, that if he does get that
reputation, it will not be because of the HWLA letter but because he is.
22. D'SOUZA, supra note 18, at 197, 199.
23. The HWLA letter was dated March 23; Macneil's response was dated April 3. D'SouzA,
supra note 18, at 295.
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even knowing that I had been charged;... the conviction was based
on statements of unnamed informers; and . . . punishment had
already been administered in the form of libel.24
Here too one has to be alert to what is implicit in the incident. First,
note the language of criminal charges and convictions, which would seem
to be inapposite where, as it seems, no material consequences flowed
from the HWLA letter. Macneil said that the letter itself was "intimidat-
ing," and he obviously was extremely upset by it. Still, on the face of it
the letter simply says that some students disagreed with what Macneil
had said in class. Later Macneil said that "teachers and students are
entitled to express ... views [like his] without fear."2  Why should not
students be entitled to express views contrary to his without eliciting
such an extreme response as Macneil's?26
Second, notice the reference to unnamed informers. We are supposed
to think back to the McCarthy era, to which Macneil refers, when people
were indeed fired from jobs on the basis of information provided by
unnamed informers. But what exactly was involved? The HWLA letter,
which was signed by the Association's chair, criticized Macneil's
casebook for including probably the most celebrated quotation from
Byron's Don Juan, referring to Julia, who, "whispering, 'I will ne'er con-
sent,'--consented. '"I" The quotation does appear in the book, and,
although referring to unnamed informers would seem entirely irrelevant
as to this charge, surely the signature of the HWLA's chair is sufficient.
Other charges involved some of Macneil's comments in his contracts
class. "Unnamed informers" might be more relevant here, but it is not.
First, Macneil never denied making the statements; his defense was that
they did not show that he was sexist. Second, at Harvard the contracts
course runs for a full year. Consider a woman student who found Mac-
neil's comments objectionable. Surely it would be reasonable for her to
believe that disclosing her name to Macneil might place her at risk dur-
ing the grading process-if only by making it less likely that Macneil
would increase her grade because of her class performance after giving
her an exam grade through an anonymous process.28
24. Macneil, supra note 18, at 10 (summarizing opening of Macneil's letter in response to
HWLA letter).
25. Id. at 11.
26. For additional discussion, see Part III infra.
27. For another appearance in the legal literature, see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19
(1946) (Jackson, J., dissenting). This quotation does not appear in the excerpts of the case in
GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1493 (2d ed. 1991), or WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR, JESSE
CHOPER & STEVEN SHIFFIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1093-94 (7th ed. 1991). But see GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1507 (12th ed. 1991); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST
AMENDMENT 773 (1991). My hypothesis is that sensitivity to the use of the quotation varies on
generational lines.
28. I should note as well that faculty members at Georgetown have been told that some students
here simply do not believe that exams are graded anonymously.
[Vol. 4: 127
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Finally, Macneil seems not to have appreciated the significance of the
fact that he did not "even know[ ] that he had been charged." Why did
the women students choose to express their disagreements through a
public letter rather than through a private discussion with Macneil?
Macneil says that "HWLA's expressed goal was to prevent Harvard
from making me an offer of a permanent appointment."29 That, how-
ever, only shifts the question back one stage. Why did the association
want to block a permanent appointment?
My experience suggests that the HWLA's course of action provides
evidence of a breakdown in classroom communication that lends support
to the charges of sexism. Although I am uncomfortable with using spe-
cific personal experiences as the basis for a critical analysis of another
teacher's performance, a° I recently had some that bear on the Macneil
episode. In successive years students came to me after the class in which
I discussed Bowers v. Hardwick.3' One year a conservative student told
me that I characterized Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in an
unnecessarily harsh way, making it difficult for students who agreed with
the result to speak up in class. The following year a gay student told me
that I had characterized the claim that homosexuality was an immutable
trait in an unnecessarily deprecating way.
What I find significant about these incidents is that the students,
believing that I had behaved badly in class, told me so to my face in an
informal setting. The fact that the women students in Macneil's class
were not comfortable in doing the same with him suggests that, whatever
the possibility of an articulate defense against the particular charges,
something was going on in Macneil's classroom to which he should have
been paying attention but was not.32
In short, there is both less and more to the Macneil incident than
29. Macneil, supra note 18, at 10.
30. See Mark Tushnet, On Being a Bad Law Teacher, CLS: NEWSLETTER OF THE CONFERENCE
ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 22 (May 1987).
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. I acknowledge that the gay student may have approached me as he did because he believed
that I was fundamentally on his side, and that the conservative student may have done so because he
was just a nice guy. As to the latter, and without reference to the particular student (who I have no
reason to believe was involved), I note that about a month later I returned from vacation to find out
that some apparently conservative students had distributed an unsigned letter to some members of
the faculty criticizing me partly on political grounds. I did not care enough about the incident to
investigate, so I do not know precisely what was in the letter or who received it. I gather, however,
that it criticized me in part for trying to indoctrinate my students in my left-wing views, for being a
bad teacher, and for being on leave a great deal while drawing a large salary. (It struck me that the
authors might not have realized that they had written a classic "bad news, good news" letter: "The
bad news is that he tries to indoctrinate students; the good news is that he's not very good at it, and
he's not around enough to do much of it anyway.") I recount the incident to show only that not all
conservative students at Georgetown are nice. Perhaps the anonymity of the letter signals the kind
of breakdown in classroom communication I mentioned in connection with Macneil, but, from what
I gathered about the letter, it did not have the accusatory tone rooted in specific classroom incidents
that the HWLA letter did, which suggests to me that the author(s) were not particularly concerned
about what had happened to them.
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D'Souza and Macneil present. There is less to it because, for all the sug-
gestions about losing a job and McCarthyism, Macneil seems not to have
suffered a great deal materially from the incident. There is more to it
because, for all the suggestions that the HWLA was inappropriately
attempting to advance a particular political agenda, there is reason to
believe that the women students were accurately perceiving difficulties in
Macneil's pedagogy. On the basis of the published reports, though, a
detached observer would find it hard to figure out exactly what had
happened.
C. Conclusion
The political correctness story plainly needs better reporting. And
again, when serious reporters actually pursue a story in detail, it can turn
out to be rather different from the "urban legend" that the underlying
incident generates. Here is an account of an incident at a lecture spon-
sored by the National Association of Scholars, dealing with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. 3 3 Newsday reporters did serious reporting about the inci-
dent, relying on interviews and "an audio tape of the first 60 minutes of
the talk."' 34 A rumor circulated on campus that a member of the Ku
Klux Klan was to speak at the meeting. Hispanic and African-American
students organized a protest. Outside the lecture hall a faculty member
leading the group admonished them "to refrain from disruption." They
entered the hall "in an orderly manner." The disruption occurred about
15 minutes into the talk and lasted, according to the tape, for four min-
utes, after which the lecture concluded "without incident or interrup-
tion." The student who disrupted the lecture exchanged obscenities with
the lecturer, "tossed a wad of chewing gum" at one of the lecturer's col-
leagues, and deposited a used Kleenex in the lecturer's coffee cup. The
lecturer afterwards said that "more forceful acts seemed possible" and
that the situation "felt quite ugly to him." An investigator for the cam-
pus police said that "it was just one case of disruption by one individ-
ual".'3  Here is how a Wall Street Journal editorial, "Return of the
Storm Troopers," described the incident:
Two hundred students-some carrying sticks and canes--come
roaring into a quiet lecture hall and post themselves menacingly in
the aisles and at the exits. The threat of violence is clear and soon
fulfilled. The mob disrupts the talk, jeers the speaker. An elderly,
distinguished professor in the audience barely escapes a beating at
33. The National Association of Scholars is a group of professors who organized to offer an
alternative to what they perceived as the political correctness movement.
34. That there was a tape of the first 60 minutes already suggests that the talk could not have
been too terribly disrupted.
35. Fireman, supra note 9, at 34.
[Vol. 4:127
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss1/6
Tushnet
the hands of one of the mob.36
II. QUESTIONS OF PEDAGOGY
Two issues routinely get confused in discussions of political correct-
ness: whether someone had a right to say something, and whether he was
right to say it. The Macneil incident is typical. Macneil calls his critics
"McCarthy-ite" because they objected to his expressing the view, at least
for pedagogic purposes, that "the sexual relation was in fact-and prop-
erly so-like a commercial exchange." 37 That, however, was not what
they objected to (or at least so it appears from the accounts by D'Souza
and Macneil, a qualification I will hereafter omit). They did not object to
his expressing the view. They objected to the view, that is, to the claim
that the sexual relation was in fact like a commercial exchange, and,
more important, they objected to the way in which he expressed the view.
My concerns as an educator lie with the latter issue, because it raises
important questions about appropriate pedagogy.38
A. The Politics of Language and Failed Jokes
Macneil got into trouble, he says, in part because of his efforts at
humor. Unfortunately, he plainly does not understand what the problem
was. The HWLA letter said that Macneil had made "flippant, disparag-
ing remarks" in
dealing with language that might be considered sexist. Among
them: 'Posner was the grandfather-or should I say grand-
mother?--of this idea.' 'That would be a strawman-or do we use
that word anymore?' 'Sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander-I
don't know, is that sexist?'39
According to D'Souza, Macneil
claimed that 'the joke is about the difficulties of using the poor old
common everyday English language.' If he were to stop students or
himself every time they used a gender-specific phrase, Macneil said,
'the class would come to a grinding halt.' Finally Macneil said he
believed his humor was in good form and was part of his teaching
style.'
It seems helpful to examine the examples to see what, pedagogically,
36. Return of the Storm Troopers, WALL STREET J., April 10, 1991, at A22.
37. Macneil, supra note 18, at 11.
38. A teacher who holds a view that a substantial number of students finds offensive faces the
pedagogical problem of finding a way to induce those students to consider that view on its merits.
For a brief discussion, see note 32 supra. I believe Macneil's difficulties arose at least in part because
he failed to solve that problem.
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might have been going on.4' No one contends that when one mentions
an identified male person, one ought to follow up with a gender-neutral
reference.42 In flagging the reference to Posner, then, Macneil, not his
women students, interrupted the class and singled out the issue of gender
references as a matter for attention. The other examples are similar in
pedagogic effect. As Macneil put it, these were "jokes about the difficul-
ties of using everyday English to do everything everyone wants to do
with it" because they "juxtapos[ed]" gender-specific language with "a
non-gender idea."43 I confess to being puzzled about how ordinary eve-
ryday English cannot do the job of identifying the originator of an idea
without a gender-specific reference; I think I just did it."
There is a more important issue here. To characterize his comments
as "jokes," even as failed jokes, is to miss the pedagogic point.45 Once
Macneil makes an issue in the classroom about whether he ought to use
gender-neutral references, at least some students are going to start paying
attention to whether he uses such references or not, rather than to con-
tract law. Those who are interested in promoting gender-neutral refer-
ences do not advocate "stopping the class" whenever a gender-specific
reference is used. They hope that the references will become as natural
as gender-specific references used to be. From their point of view, it is
probably worse to flag the issue obtrusively than to use male-specific ref-
erences unobtrusively. By obtrusively interjecting the question of gender
41. I believe that serious pedagogic issues are raised by an instructor's decision to refrain from
using gender-neutral terms, but Macneil's actions, which did not involve a considered decision to do
so, raise different pedagogic issues, to which I direct my attention.
42. I recall reading an article, David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating
the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247 (1990), in which a mad search-and-replace function
had substituted "she" and "her" for every "he" and "his," even when the reference was to identified
people like Warren Burger. I understand that the entire issue of the Law Review was reprinted with
a corrected version of the article.
43. Macneil, supra note 18, at 11.
44. Robin West has suggested to me that Macneil's statements might helpfully be compared to
these: "He was a real blackguard--or do we use that word anymore?" or "The natural law idea has a
dark side-I don't know, is that racist?"
45. When Joel Conarroe called it "startling to see Joseph Epstein... amusing himself... by
likening feminists to pit bulls and making little jokes about 'Dykes on Bikes,'" Joel Conarroe, How
I'm PC, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1991, at A29, Epstein responded by missing the point and, startlingly,
criticizing Conarroe for failing "to practice intellectual scrupulosity." Joseph Epstein, Letter to the
Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991, at A14. The first reference, Epstein says, was a remark on "the
snarly humorlessness of academic feminists .... [whose] behavior made understandable the joke
about the couple in Manhattan who, to ward off burglary, argued about whether to get a revolver or
a pit bull and finally compromised and got a feminist." The second reference was based on a
misquotation Epstein picked up, in which the female president of the Modem Language Association
was said to have said that "the attack on the more bizarre aspects of literary studies was.., nothing
more than an attempt 'to preserve the cultural and political supremacy of white heterosexual
males.'" Epstein's comment was that this was "less appropriate to the president of the MLA than
to a member of Dykes on Bikes." Epstein's response ended, "under political correctness, one
attempts humor at one's peril." Not quite. Under any circumstances, offensive comments are rarely
funny. And, when one presents offensive comments under the pretense that they are humorous, one
is fair game for criticism-for being both offensive and not funny, which is what Conarroe said. To
find that Conarroe's statement lacked "intellectual scrupulosity" is precisely to demonstrate the vice
Conarroe identified.
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references, Macneil made an issue of something irrelevant to the course
he was teaching. And, in flagging the issue by making jokes, Macneil
trivialized it."
Macneil was sensitive to the issue when it affected him. He com-
plained that
after receiving the ... letter I found myself more distracted than
ever from what I was trying to teach. There was one case, for
instance, involving a male lawyer who had started off representing
both parties to a real-estate transaction. Later, in violation of his
ethical obligations, the lawyer threatened one of the parties with
stringent enforcement of the contract. I referred to him as having
switched from being a Big Brother to trying to batter the clients and
then caught myself. 'Oh, my God, brother-battered women!' It
took five minutes before I really got my mind back to the subject
again.
Yet, that is precisely what the HWLA objected to in Macneil's "jokes."
As D'Souza puts it, they found his pedagogy "a barrier to learning and
therefore a form of discrimination."48 When Macneil interrupted himself
to flag the issue of gender-neutral language, he distracted some of his
students from the subject of the course. He may have had a right to do
that, but he was not right to do it.
Perhaps, though, the correct response to the HWLA's objection is that
students ought not react to that sort of behavior as they do. Here com-
plex pedagogic issues arise. A teacher has to start with students where
they are even as he or she attempts to help them move elsewhere. That
some students react badly to a teacher's pedagogic style is a fact of life
with which the teacher has to deal. Teachers, particularly as they get
older and as the generations of students pass before them, sometimes find
themselves in a pedagogic environment where enough students hold
views that the teacher thinks completely wrong-headed that some peda-
gogic adjustment is essential. One cannot "get away" with some peda-
gogic styles any more, even if one believes that those pedagogic styles are
more effective than alternatives. At that point the teacher has to do
something. Of course he or she can ignore the student reaction, but then
he or she can hardly be heard to complain that those students object to
the pedagogic style.
Suppose, for example, a teacher believes that her job is to make stu-
dents uncomfortable with the ideas they have come complacently to
accept, and also believes that students have become hypersensitive to dis-
46. I recall attending a conference at which Michael Perry gave a talk in which he routinely and
naturally used female terms to refer to judges. He was followed on the podium by Daniel Oliver,
then (I believe) of the Federal Communications Commission, who commented on how barbarous he
thought Perry's practice was. Oliver was followed on the podium by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
47. Macneil, supra note 18, at 10.
48. D'SouzA, supra note 18, at 199.
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comfort. She will not be effective in her primary task-making students
uncomfortable with their complacency about ideas-if she makes them
uncomfortable about themselves. Given the students' hypersensitivity,
the teacher must somehow insinuate herself into the students' lives, in
some sense making them comfortable with being in the classroom as a
predicate to making them uncomfortable with their ideas.
I would be a better teacher than I am if I could spell out ways of doing
so. I believe that simple self-assurance and confidence in one's own
authority-in the sense that one is an authority on the subject of study-
can go a long way toward creating a classroom atmosphere in which
students can become uncomfortable with their ideas. Unfortunately, few
teachers today have the required degree of authority; more often, we pre-
tend that we are authorities in the relevant sense, and then bluster in the
classroom for fear of being found out.49 Alternatively, one might model
the engaged scholar for one's students, by visibly wrestling with difficult
issues about which one remains uncertain. Again, few teachers today
have the requisite uncertainty; most of us, across the political spectrum,
are overly confident that we know the right answers.50 In any event, an
"in your face" attitude does not promise much success.
Macneil acknowledged this, but failed to appreciate its implications.
His letter to Commentary opened,
Socratic teachers demanding attendance, preparation, promptness,
and class participation win few popularity contests in American law
schools. Especially at Harvard Law School the advocates of such
professionalism have largely either long since died, retired, fled, or
hunkered down into quiet safety. As a visitor I therefore hardly
expected a very warm welcome in my contracts class. 5'
Here Macneil expressly aligns himself with an old-fashioned pedagogy,
which is perfectly all right, although the contemptuous tone-albeit
adopted after the events-suggests other difficulties Macneil might have
anticipated. He might have gone on to consider that a teacher who starts
out setting himself against his students is likely to find that some students
will magnify other dimensions of his behavior, making, for example, a big
issue of his sexism when it might have gone less noticed had they liked
49. There may be a special difficulty in asserting this sort of authority in teaching law. Simply
put, there is rather little for law teachers to be authorities about. In first-year classes, we purport to
be teaching people to think like lawyers, which I suppose means that we are trying to instill in them
a desire to make extremely precise statements about contested issues of value, and to use a relatively
small number of distinctive substantive arguments that characterize common-law reasoning.
50. I recall being told that Malcolm Sharp once came to his first year Contracts class and, visibly
distressed, told his students that they had to get in touch with the students who had taken the course
the year before to tell them that Sharp had changed his mind about "the cow case," Sherwood v.
Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). The story may be apocryphal, or Sharp may have been
feigning distress, but as a story it illustrates behavior that one rarely sees today.
51. Macneil, Letter, supra note 18, at 10.
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him more as a teacher.52
Alternatively, the teacher can try to accommodate the difficulty, even
while trying to move the students away from their oversensitivity. I can
imagine a decent contracts class being taught around the issue of "the
difficulties of using everyday English to do everything everyone wants to
do with it." Indeed, I can imagine that issue being the whole point of a
contracts course. And I can imagine that it might be appropriate at some
point to discuss the question of gender-specific terms used to convey gen-
der-neutral ideas as an illustration of the problem. Finally, I can imagine
the point of the lesson being that, at least with some culturally rooted
references like "sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander," the juxtaposi-
tion ought to raise no problems. I suspect, however, that only a truly
extraordinary teacher could, by making jokes about the question, help
students who find gender-specific references interfering with their ability
to learn, move to what the teacher thinks is a more appropriate
position.5
3
B. The Politics of Literary Allusions
That Macneil believed that he had answered the HWLA's letter by his
analysis of jokes indicates, once again, that there were more problems in
his classroom than he was willing to acknowledge. His response to the
Don Juan quotation, which D'Souza calls "the main charge" against
Macneil, provides more evidence of the pedagogic difficulties that his
attachment to old-fashioned ways caused in the environment in which he
found himself.
What can a teacher accomplish by citing something, like Don Juan,
outside the range of the subject matter? Macneil explained that the quo-
tation was "a perfect summary" of an issue in contract law, the so-called
"Battle of Forms," which occurs, as D'Souza puts it, "when parties
attempt to negotiate contracts on their own terms [and] believe that they
are not dealing on the other person's terms; yet they go ahead with the
contract, knowing that both parties' initial terms cannot have been
satisfied."
54
For a quotation like this to work pedagogically, students who are
somewhat confused by the legal discussion of the Battle of the Forms
must be able to draw on their appreciation of the quotation's more
52. I also find it hard to avoid the wisdom of the evidentiary rule, "falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus" in a variant-"Old-fashioned in one thing (pedagogy), old-fashioned in others (sexism)."
53. Although I agree with the main point of Eugene Genovese's review of Illiberal Education,
The New Republic, April 15, 1991, at 30, I believe that Genovese underestimates the pedagogic
difficulties that would confront a teacher who adopted Genovese's "First Law of College Teaching,"
that an instructor should "seize every opportunity to offend the sensibilities of his students." Id. at
33. A superb teacher could do so from the outset of the class, and a good one probably ought to do
so by the end of a semester. Less talented teachers, though, are likely to fail as teachers if they follow
Genovese's law these days.
54. D'SouzA, supra note 18, at 198.
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homely way of putting the point. They will learn the law, that is, if they
think, "What happens in the Battle of the Forms is just like what hap-
pens when Julia, whispering I will ne'er consent, consents. Oh, I get it."
The HWLA letter said that the quotation "exempliflied] 'the attitude
that "women mean yes when they say no," thereby promoting a danger-
ous misperception which has come under fierce attack.' " This makes a
substantive point, which bears on the pedagogy of the quotation. The
letter implies that, whatever might have been true in the past, for some
students today the quotation fails to work pedagogically. For them, the
quotation describes a woman being raped, and Macneil's pedagogic point
becomes, "The Battle of Forms is just like a rape." I can imagine that
that was the point Macneil was trying to get across-it is not inconsistent
with his description of the Battle of the Forms, and it may be an accurate
way of thinking about the Battle-but, somehow, I doubt it.
Indeed, Macneil seems to have doubted it. For, he told the HWLA, if
it gave him "an equally concise, apt and literate quotation which makes
this point without sex identification," he "would use it in future revisions
of the casebook."56 Here we can see another, non-pedagogic function of
the quotation. Using it demonstrates to students that Macneil is in con-
tact with certain classics of literature. His request to the HWLA sug-
gests that he believes that they ought to be in contact with similar
classics. The quotation, that is, simultaneously makes a substantive
point and indicates a cultural affiliation which Macneil has and recom-
mends to his readers.
Once again, though, Macneil's traditionalism may get in the way of his
pedagogy. It may be merely a regrettable fact of life, but these days a
quotation from Don Juan is, for many students, roughly like Cervantes's
allusions to Orlando Furioso. Rather than linking the author backward
to Byron and forward to his or her students, it separates the students
from the author. And, an author who insists on using such a quota-
tion-and here the substantive point the quotation is intended to make is
irrelevant-is deliberately distancing himself or herself from the stu-
dents. One might adopt the pedagogic strategy of distancing, as a way of
demonstrating that one is an authority on the relevant subject to students
for whom one is trying to be model. Yet, when the "distancing" occurs
in connection with a collateral matter such as general cultural literacy, it
.seems likely to get in the way of effective pedagogy. It becomes another
example of the kind of behavior that may have led the HWLA to act
through a public letter rather than a private discussion.
But, Macneil went further. He "asked" the HWLA to provide an
alternative quotation. I confess that I find this outrageously insensitive.
55. Quoted from Macneil, supra note 18, at 10.
56. D'SouzA, supra note 18, at 198.
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Macneil is a senior professor of law, self-consciously a traditionalist in
pedagogy and, as his quotation from Byron indicates, in culture as well.
Asking law students to supply him with an alternative quotation
"equally concise, apt and literate" can only reinforce the sense of
powerlessness in the classroom that the students were already expres-
sing.3 7 The overall impression left by reading Macneil's response to the
HWLA letter, I think, is that he still did not get the point.
C. Conclusion
A final example of how the political correctness controversy has
obscured serious pedagogic issues comes from New York University Law
School. As reported by Nat Hentoff, the moot court board at NYU
designed a problem in which a father's representative was to argue
against awarding a five-year-old child's custody to her mother, who was
living in a lesbian relationship with a companion. 8 Some students
objected that they were being forced to argue a position that they found
morally repugnant, and that the father's position, as they saw it, was "so
weak" that they would be "at a disadvantage" in the moot court compe-
tition. The moot court board then substituted a problem dealing with
homeowner liability for injuries resulting from untrimmed trees, and ulti-
mately allowed students to choose whether they would argue the custody
case or the tort case.
Anthony Amsterdam argued that the students who objected to the
custody problem were wrong. "How can we ever rid our society of anti-
gay biases unless we formulate the strongest arguments we can possibly
make against those biases? And how can we do that if we don't also
formulate the strongest arguments that could be made to support the
biases?" Amsterdam, normally quite attentive to questions of pedagogy,
seems to have slipped here. Although Hentoff, and elsewhere in his argu-
ment Amsterdam, seem to think that the underlying issue is one of fore-
closing "intellectual inquiry," the only real issue is pedagogic. Will
requiring law students to present arguments on behalf of a position they
find morally repugnant make them better lawyers?
There are many issues to sort out. First, it seems entirely irrelevant
that "to rid the society of anti-gay biases," someone will have to be able
to rebut the strongest arguments that can be made to support the biases.
Not all law students-not even all gay law students-will actively take
part in the struggle for gay rights, and it is not clear why future real
estate lawyers should be forced to take a position they find morally
repugnant simply to exercise their mental muscles.5 9
57. But, just to help Macneil out, how about: "Ad Reinhardt's paintings or John Cage's music."
58. Nat Hentoff, 'Politically Correct' at NYU Law, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 1990, at A23.
59. I have been struck by the fact that Amsterdam's argument suggests that students who were
indifferent to the issues raised by the problem ought to have objected to the custody problem
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Second, there is a difference between coming up with arguments in
order to rebut them, and being forced to stand up, even in the artificial
setting of a moot court competition, and present them. Trial and appel-
late advocates often say that truly effective lawyers present themselves as
if they really believe the positions they are asserting. It seems to me quite
problematic, morally, to urge a student to become a good lawyer by
appearing to believe a position he or she finds morally repugnant. At the
very least, raising the issue, as the objecting students did, ought to pro-
voke serious thinking about the moral dimensions of legal education
rather than mindless invocations of academic freedom.
Third, and related, the passage from ordinary citizen to lawyer is mor-
ally hazardous, and law schools ought to be sensitive, in their pedagogy,
to the shoals on which students might founder.' The lawyer's role-dif-
ferentiated morality, in which a lawyer becomes a hired gun without
standing behind the client's position, makes strenuous moral demands on
a person trying to be good. At some point, I believe, lawyers have to take
on the moral burdens, but a law school attentive to the morally hazard-
ous passage would do well not to thrust those demands on its students
too early or abruptly, as the custody problem did.6"
The problem, then, is not that Macneil and the NYU moot court
board were politically incorrect. The problem is that they were pedagog-
ically incorrect.
III. QUESTIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In introducing the issue of the morally hazardous passage into the
legal profession, I have opened up a set of issues about academic free-
dom. I approach these issues by triangulating them. First, I consider the
appropriate stance an institution of higher education is permitted to take
with respect to the moral formation of its students. For, if a university
can take a position about that, many issues that have come up under the
heading of political correctness look very different: rather than enforcing
an orthodoxy in violation of academic freedom, the universities are per-
forming their permissible role of helping shape the characters of their
students.62 Second, I consider the relation between student exercises of
because, on Amsterdam's argument, they were being deprived of the opportunity to develop the best
arguments in favor of a position they found morally objectionable.
60. A nice recent discussion of the hazards is CHRIs GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE
(1990), a journalist's account of the first year at Yale Law School.
61. I simply note the additional hazard posed to young gay and lesbian people, who routinely
must confront the conflict between their sexual identities and the society's most frequent
communications about what is morally appropriate, by the custody problem. The hazard is
probably heightened by the fact that it is a custody problem, and therefore raises issues about the
relationship between one's sexual identity and the mechanisms of legacy, which, again, students of
law-school age are likely to be quite concerned about.
62. This is one dimension of what has been called "institutional" academic freedom, which
sometimes appears to conflict with "individual" academic freedom. For extensive discussions,
compare J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:" A "Special Concern" of the First Amendment, 99 YALE
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their free expression rights, as in the HWLA's distribution of its letter,
and the university's position on academic freedom. These inquiries
frame the residual issues of academic freedom more precisely.
A. Universities, Moral Formation, and Academic Freedom
The easiest examples of universities properly taking an interest in their
students' moral formation are religious institutions with a faith commit-
ment to a particular vision of moral formation. When a Catholic univer-
sity, for example, issues official statements indicating its disapproval of
homosexuality, it is surely acting within its rights (although, again, it
may not be acting rightly). Georgetown University engaged in pro-
tracted litigation to assert its right to do no more than its faith commit-
ments permitted in its treatment of student gay and lesbian
organizations.63 Notably, when the litigation ended with the applicable
human rights ordinance interpreted in a way that the University found
acceptable, Congress intervened to tell Georgetown and other religious
institutions in the District of Columbia that, if they wanted to, they
could ignore the human rights ordinance."
Religious institutions present a particularly strong case for allowing
the university to take a position about moral formation, but the case is, I
think, only slightly weaker for private universities without distinctive
religious commitments.65 Thus, to use an example that routinely comes
up in discussions of political correctness, it hardly seems objectionable
for Smith College, a private institution, to give new students a pamphlet
alerting them to "lookism," the "construction of a standard for beauty"
that may lead people to place value (positive or negative) on what people
say simply because of the degree to which they fit the standard of
beauty.66 Or, at least, it could be objectionable only on the merits, for
example, on the ground that lookism is not a serious enough problem to
alert students about.
That the merits are what conservative critics of political correctness
avoid can be seen by noting the controversy over higher education that
immediately preceded the political correctness controversy. This contro-
versy over higher education was precipitated by Allan Bloom's The Clos-
L.J. 251 (1989) (leaning toward resolving conflicts in favor of institutional freedom), with David A.
Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the
First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 227 (Summer 1990) (leaning the other way).
63. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C.D.C. 1987).
64. P.L. 101-168, § 141 (1989).
65. On the constitutional level, Oregon Dep't of Human Services v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
seems rather clearly to imply that arguments about religious and non-religious universities are to be
analyzed in the same way. For a somewhat more extended discussion, see Tushnet, Public and
Private Schools: Is There a Constitutional Difference, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43.
66. For a citation to the pamphlet, see Lucas, Free Speech Falls to the Campus Thought Police,
THE INDEPENDENT, June 9, 1991, at 13. For a discussion of the problems created by lookism, see
NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH (1991).
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ing of the American Mind, whose message was precisely that universities
were shirking their obligation to assist in the moral formation of their
students by accepting the orthodoxy of relativism. It seems particularly
confused to criticize universities both for trying to tell their students that
some behavior is right and other behavior is wrong (as with lookism,
sexism, or racism), and for inculcating relativism, but it has been done.67
The only way to make sense of this discourse is to understand that
critics of political correctness are trying to disagree with some particular
values that the universities are inculcating, without explaining why uni-
versities should attempt to inculcate different values. The role that the
"lookism" statement plays in discussions of political correctness is, I
think, revealing. The rhetorical moves are evident: the writer takes con-
cern about lookism to be almost universally regarded as silly. The
implicit message is, "You'd have to be a real fanatic to be concerned
about something as frivolous as 'lookism.' "'6 The writer then associates
that effort with communications about sexism and racism. Having dis-
credited the concern for lookism, the writer attempts to discredit the lat-
ter as well.69 And, of course, all this occurs without any overt discussion
of whether it is a good thing or a bad thing for universities to be con-
cerned about their students' moral formation regarding racism and
sexism.
To proceed further, I must expand the examples in two directions.
First, suppose the university takes its position, not in a generalized state-
ment, but in a more focused setting. For example, according to News-
week, Mt. Holyoke's president "upbraided" students who "mocked" the
college's gay and lesbian student association "by proclaiming 'Heterosex-
ual Awareness Week,'" saying that they "violat[ed] the spirit of 'com-
munity.' "7o To clarify the problem, let me assume that the only thing
the president did was issue a statement, and that the statement included a
forthright declaration that, although the students were within their rights
to mock other students, they should not have done so. Second, suppose
67. See, e.g., Novak, Thought Police, FORBES MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1990, at 212.
68. In light of this assumption, I suppose I should state explicitly that I do not regard the
concern as frivolous. For a discussion of discrimination on the basis of appearance, see Note, Facial
Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (1987). Discrimination on the basis of weight or size, which is
certainly related to lookism, is widespread. See, e.g., Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29 UCLA L. REV. 947 (1982); Paul Steven Miller,
Coming Up Short: Employment Discrimination Against Little People, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
231 (1987). I am reasonably confident that law school faculties discriminate on the basis of
appearance in hiring, on the margins (where all decisions are made). And, I find statements like
"dumb blonde" on one end, and "So pretty, and so smart too," on the other, quite offensive. Finally,
lookism is bound up with, though not identical to (consider the image of the dumb surfer guy),
sexism, and I doubt that it is accidental that the statement about lookism was issued by Smith
College, a historically female college.
69. I believe that something quite similar is involved in the failed efforts at humor discussed
supra, text accompanying notes 41-48.
70. See Adler, Taking Offense, supra note 2, at 48.
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that the president's statement is directed not at student behavior but at
some comments a professor made in the classroom. Again, assume that
the president's statement simply "upbraids" the professor while acknowl-
edging that academic freedom protected his right to make the comments.
Does the tighter focus of the college's statement about what it believes its
role in students' moral formation to be, in the first example, and the more
indirect connection between the professor's comments and student moral
formation, in the second, alter the analysis?
7'
Although a university may properly take an interest in student moral
formation, the values of academic freedom certainly impose some con-
straints on what universities ordinarily can do.72 This essay is not the
place to provide a full analysis of the relation between institutional self-
definition, which is what the question of moral formation raises, and the
academic freedom of students and professors. For present purposes, it
seems sufficient to identify two kinds of constraints. The first is that the
university ought not pursue its interest in moral formation in ways that
violate well-established norms of the academy. An intemperate denunci-
ation of identifiable students, for example, is almost certainly inappropri-
ate, in part because it conflicts with the aim of communicating to other
students how they should behave, but in part because it is unprofes-
sional.73 A strong generalized statement, in contrast, seems consistent
both with professional norms and the university's interest, if it chooses to
take one, in moral formation.
The second constraint is best described as political.74 A college may
discredit its own efforts at moral formation if those efforts become the
focus of political contention on campus or off. From the institution's
point of view, prudence dictates some restraint. And, more descriptively,
every university president knows that many constituencies are alert to
what happens on campus. Actions that alienate some constituencies
without generating offsetting support from others will impair the univer-
sity's ability to continue on the course it has chosen.7"
The political constraints on moral formation are particularly relevant
when we turn from private institutions to public ones. My primary con-
71. It seems appropriate to note that a strikingly high number of the incidents identified as
particularly outrageous by critics of political correctness involve questions of sexuality, either
feminism or gay and lesbian rights.
72. Here as elsewhere I use the term "academic freedom" to refer to a set of values bound up
with education, not to a constitutional doctrine, because the values are relevant, but the Constitution
is not, to the behavior of private institutions.
73. Thus, the Newsweek account does not provide sufficient information for one to evaluate the
statement "upbraiding" the students. As we have seen, a proper understanding of the issues often
involves consideration of details that are omitted from journalistic accounts.
74. For reasons that lie behind Part IV, I have refrained from identifying the professional norms
of the academy as a political constraint, though in other settings I would do so.
75. The political correctness controversy itself is part of the political environment. By raising
the political heat, conservatives have tried to influence the direction and amount of moral formation
that colleges and universities try to accomplish.
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cern in this essay lies with the appropriate role of universities in moral
formation, but the ability of public institutions to play that role may be
constrained by the Constitution. The extent to which the Constitution
allows public institutions to shape moral character is, I believe, one of the
most difficult issues in constitutional law; the free expression and estab-
lishment of religion questions are excruciating. Whatever the ultimate
resolution of those questions, though, it seems reasonably clear that a
large portion of the answer will rely on ordinary political processes to
limit moral formation by public institutions.76 Within broad limits and
in the long run, that is, whatever public institutions decide to do in con-
nection with moral formation is likely to be normatively acceptable,
given that they face substantial political constraints. The political setting
in which they operate means that universities-both public and private-
are likely to locate a relatively stable equilibrium point. Passing events
may shift the university away from the equilibrium temporarily, but it is
likely to be reestablished relatively quickly.
77
Universities that have a role in moral formation must accommodate
interests in individual freedom, but there is little reason to think that the
right accommodation is simple. The best illustration, perhaps, comes
from discussions of campus hate-speech regulations.78 Taking off from
outrageous examples of bureaucratic mindlessness in applying such regu-
lations,79 critics of political correctness treat hate-speech regulations of
any sort as clear infringements on individual liberty. Proponents of such
regulations, whose arguments the critics essentially ignore,80 have shown
that the question is more complicated.
I only summarize the arguments here, to show how a university's
proper concern for student moral formation complicates the analysis fur-
ther. The core of free speech law has two parts. One involves statutes
that attempt to ban speech because the government believes that the
speech may cause harms like law-breaking or violence. The other
involves regulations of streets and parks, which protestors want to use to
get their messages across. In both parts, the Supreme Court has imposed
rather substantial limits on what governments can do, because, it
76. The most acute constitutional analysis remains the relatively early MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITCS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
77. Of course, because those constraints operate over time, undoubtedly there will be incidents of
excessive zeal. For those involved in the disturbing incidents, the costs are high, and university
leaders have not always done all they could to minimize those costs and restore the equilibrium more
promptly. For a more extended discussion, see Part IV infra.
78. The literature is already enormous. For complementary discussions which cite the literature,
see Peter Linzer, White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 187 (1991); Grey,
Civil Rights Versus Civil Liberties The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 SOCIAL PHIL. &
POL. 81 (1991).
79. For a discussion of the dynamics of regulation, see Part IV infra.
80. The most acute criticisms of hate-speech regulations have come from liberals, not the
conservatives who talk about political correctness. (I exempt Nat Hentoff from this observation; he
is a liberal who has been as mindless about the issue as conservatives have.)
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believes, the society as a whole benefits from the wide availability of
speech.
The key to understanding free speech law is that the Court under-
stands that its rules do not come for free. When the government cannot
ban speech unless it can show that violence is extremely likely to occur,
occasionally speech really will cause violence (when the low probability
event actually occurs, as it inevitably will). And, if the government must
make streets available for demonstrations, commuters will have to put up
with some disruption of their ordinary activities. Notice, however, that
in these core areas of free speech, the costs of allowing speech are distrib-
uted across the whole population. Everyone bears the risk that violence
will occur; everyone who uses the streets has to put up with the
disruption.
"Hate speech" regulations are different. There, the costs of the regu-
lated speech are concentrated on vulnerable populations. Proponents of
hate speech regulations argue that this difference justifies more stringent
regulation of hate speech than we ought to allow for other types of polit-
ical speech. That might be particularly true on campus. The vulnerable
populations might be even more vulnerable because of their relative
youth. And, although everyone might benefit to some degree by hearing
hate speech (a premise of the First Amendment that need not be chal-
lenged), the amount of benefit is reduced to the degree that the university
believes that such speech is incompatible with the character it is trying to
shape in its students-those who utter the speech as well as those who
hear it.
None of this is to say that the principle of free speech justifies what
universities are said to have done. The only point is that hate speech
regulation, in the university setting, is not obviously incompatible with
the complex blend of institutional and individual academic freedom that
universities must develop."'
B. Students' Free Expression and Intimidation
Macneil writes that the HWLA letter was "intimidating" and was
intended "entirely to stifle thought and expression it did not like."82 In
Canada, an instructor reports that he believed he had his "first brush
with the thought police" after what he calls a "good humored[]" discus-
sion in his office of a student's misunderstanding of what he had said in
81. My own view on these questions draws on a different strand of First Amendment theory,
concerned with the capacity of people charged with censorship decisions to make sound judgments.
I believe that hate-speech codes are likely to be administered by people quite insensitive to real issues
of liberty and discrimination, and therefore think that they are unlikely to be a good thing as actually
implemented. (My suspicion of administrators is the primary theme of Part IV infra.) For a more
optimistic view of the capacity of university administrators, see J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and
Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEo. L.J. 399 (1991).
82. Macneil, supra note 18, at 10.
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class about the origins of jazz. 3 D'Souza says that his diaries of his trav-
els promoting his books show a "pervasive illiberalism" on campus.8 4 As
an illustration, he offers an account of a lecture he gave at Tufts Univer-
sity. About 300 hundred students attended. There were "armed police-
men" in the auditorium. 5 "Even more unsettling to me," he continues,
"two black students, a man and a woman, showed up bound to each
other in heavy metal chains. They sat in the front row and proceeded to
chain themselves to their seats." D'Souza spoke, he writes, "for the
usual 40 minutes." There were no disturbances, but "on four or five
occasions, apparently disgruntled by my remarks, the two chained stu-
dents announced their presence in the audience by loudly rattling their
accessories."
There is something quite peculiar here. Macneil calls the students
"McCarthy-ites," D'Souza calls them "goons." And what did they do?
They published a letter and rattled some chains but did not interrupt a
lecture. On the face of it, the students appear to have been exercising
their ordinary freedom of expression. 6 Of course they disagreed with
what Macneil and D'Souza said, but surely neither intends us to take
seriously the claim that people who disagree with them are engaged in
intimidation or, to use another phrase in the literature, are storm
troopers.
Consider a range of activities Macneil's students might have engaged
in. They could have gone to an associate dean to express their discom-
fort at what Macneil said in class. They could have passed out the letter
in the halls outside Macneil's classroom. They could have urged stu-
dents not to enroll in Macneil's elective courses. Finally, suppose that
the students did some or all of this intending to make it less likely that
Macneil would receive an offer of a permanent appointment or, if he
received an offer, less likely that he would accept it. Would the students
have behaved "intolerantly" or otherwise wrongly? If they really did
find Macneil's statements offensive, it is hard to see anything wrong in
their actions. Students should of course be tolerant of views they disa-
gree with. Toleration, however, does not mean nodding sagely while
someone says something offensive, or refraining from saying anything to
indicate disagreement with the statement. It may mean that serious and
sustained disruption of a speech or lecture should be avoided, so that
others can come to appreciate how offensive the speaker is. But, neither
Macneil nor D'Souza contends that their lectures were disrupted to that
83. Lynda Hurst, 'Politically Correct? Think Before You Speak, TORONTO STAR, June 2, 1991,
at Al.
84. Dinesh D'Souza, Cap and Goon, WASHINGTON POST, April 7, 1991, at D4.
85. Id. D'Souza does not indicate what the university's ordinary police practices were.
86. With a modest qualification, dealing with the modest noise and distraction of attention that
rattling the chains presumably occasioned. For a brief discussion of this qualification, see text
accompanying note 87 infra.
[Vol. 4:127
24




Perhaps toleration means putting up with a lecturer's inanities or
offensive statements in the lecture hall, confining the response to hisses
and groans, while reserving more sustained criticism for other forums.
That, however, is precisely what the HWLA did. And, even here, there
might be distinctions to be drawn. Perhaps a tolerant student ought to
be particularly sensitive to causing disruption at lectures like D'Souza's,
where people attend because they choose to and where, as D'Souza indi-
cates, an opportunity for audience discussion is available immediately
after the lecture. But, perhaps the case is different for Macneil's class,
which was required rather than elective, and in which, his discussion of
his pedagogy suggests, opportunities for disagreement were likely to be
rare.88
In what sense, then, was the HWLA letter coercive or intimidating? It
did not directly obstruct Macneil's ability to get his views, whatever they
were, across. Of course it made Macneil feel bad, as his reaction makes
abundantly clear. But, after all, Macneil's expression made some of his
students feel bad too. I am puzzled why a professor finds it intimidating
that some of his students express their disagreement with him by writing
a letter explaining what they found offensive in his actions.89
D'Souza's account of his Tufts lecture is plainly meant to convey that
he ran a real risk of physical violence; at one point he writes that he took
"a step backward" when, after his speech, a professor of Afro-American
studies said to him, "You want to know why I have my hands in my
pockets now? That's because I'm so angry I have to restrain myself."
The Canadian professor reports that a colleague told him, "Next time...
the attack will be more organized." The language of intimidation would
be appropriate if there were a real risk of physical violence. No such risk
attended Macneil, and the evidence as to D'Souza rather strongly sug-
gests that he has an exaggerated sense of physical risk to his person.
The key, I believe, is D'Souza's statement that the charges against
Macneil were unanswerable. But Macneil offered an answer to the
charges. I have already argued that, on most of the points, his answer
was unpersuasive. To say that the HWLA was intimidating because it
87. It is not even clear that the incident reported by Newsday involved such disruption. See text
accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
88. In labor law, managers must sometimes provide opportunities for organizers to use their
property (roughly, where there are no real alternative means of getting access to workers to convey
the organizers' message). There might be an analogy in the university context, particularly in
connection with required courses. The labor law requirements, though, are triggered only under
quite restrictive circumstances, such as the unavailability of other ways of reaching the target
audience, and the analogies to those circumstances are unlikely to exist on campus.
89. On the psychological level, the letter may have been intimidating because it "threatened"-
metaphorically to me, but really to Macneil-the degree of control over the classroom that he found
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made unanswerable charges is, under these circumstances, to say that it
is intimidating to disagree with Macneil. If there is any totalitarianism in
these events, it is that assertion.
C. Official Power and Intimidation
Critics of political correctness toss about terms like "McCarthy-ite,"
"storm troopers," and "thought police." As applied to incidents like the
HWLA letter or D'Souza's Tufts lecture, those terms seem strikingly
inapt. A large part of what made McCarthyism wrong was that behind
Senator McCarthy's expressions lay the force of the government--or,
more broadly, official power." Most of the remainder of what made
McCarthyism wrong was that official power was called down upon peo-
ple for what they did outside the classroom.9"
Discussions of political correctness rarely provide examples of inci-
dents in which, at the end of the day, official power was used to enforce
political correctness; the Hoagland story that I opened with is typical.92
At most, the incidents show administrations taking too long to do the
right thing. That is an important phenomenon, to which I devote the
next section. But, what is then involved is the failure of universities to
exercise their power, which raises another set of issues. Thus, I am con-
fined to a hypothetical case, to show once again that what is at issue in
the political correctness discussion is much more complicated than most
participants are willing to admit.
Stanley Fish of Duke University proposed that university officials
refrain from appointing members of the National Association of Scholars
to university committees dealing with tenure and promotion. I suspect
that Fish was not entirely serious in making this proposal, and to no
one's surprise it was rejected. Suppose, however, that the university had
agreed with Fish. It would certainly look like an exercise of official
power--denial of positions otherwise available to faculty members-in
the service of political correctness.
Consider, though, the following scenario. Suppose that literary studies
and political science had both been dominated for years by ethical rela-
90. Similarly as to Storm Troopers, at least after 1933.
91. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES
(1986); Gerald Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665
(1987). The rest of what was wrong with McCarthyism is that it was wrong on the merits. Once
again, we see how a particular rhetoric is used to avoid discussion of the merits.
92. For another example, see Editorial, PC at Hampshire College, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at
A6. As usual, the incident is complicated and badly reported. Apparently, a faculty committee had
recommended reappointment for two professors whose comments had attracted adverse comments
as politically incorrect. The president referred the matter to the college committee on faculty
appointments; the editorial suggests that was unusual (although in one case the faculty vote was 20-
7, and many institutions do take special care in cases where there are a substantial number of
negative votes). The committee recommended against renewal. One professor then appealed to the
committee on academic freedom, which found in his favor. When the editorial appeared, the
president had referred the matter to "yet another academic body," otherwise undescribed.
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tivists who did not believe that there were correct interpretations of texts
or events, only constructs observers imposed on them afterwards.
Recently, however, serious students of literature have come to believe
that texts do indeed have objectively correct readings. That has caused
turmoil in the discipline, with charges of bad scholarship and bad faith
being flung by the relativists and the objectivists. At one university, after
going through many struggles over hiring and promotion decisions, the
literature faculty has reached an accommodation between the old-fash-
ioned relativists and the new objectivists. They are concerned, however,
that appointments and promotions in their department will be considered
by a university-wide committee that has members from the political sci-
ence department, where the old relativist orthodoxy prevails unchal-
lenged. The literature faculty could, I think, reasonably be concerned
that such a committee might not be able to consider fairly their recom-
mendations on appointment and tenure, because the political scientists
are likely to think that the objectivist works some literature candidates
present are simply outside the bounds of scholarly acceptability. The
literature faculty might propose that the university authorities not
appoint to the university-wide tenure and promotion committee members
of the political science department.
With some modifications, that is Fish's proposal.9" I am inclined to
think that it ought to be rejected because the assumption that people with
strongly held views about what counts as serious scholarship cannot
fairly assess work by people with different criteria for judging serious
scholarship is probably wrong. But, I do not believe that the proposal
necessarily rejects fundamental premises of academic freedom. Indeed, it
aims to promote academic freedom, and it can be rejected only after
fairly considering whether it or the traditional practice is the better way
to do so.
IV. PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION
I have argued that the issues associated with political correctness are
far more complicated than most discussions have assumed. I do not
mean to suggest that there are no problems whatever. The problem,
though, is not that universities are under a reign of terror in which a
liberal orthodoxy is imposed on an unwilling faculty and student body.
The problem, I believe, is that university administrators really do not
have any idea about the educational aims of their university. They see
93. Given the circumstances under which he made the proposal, and his likely lack of
seriousness about it, I take it to be a minor misstep that Fish suggested that no members of the
National Association of Scholars be appointed to the relevant committee. If, as I suspect, there is a
fairly high correlation between membership and belief in objectivism, the misstep is understandable,
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themselves as politicians and managers who happen to work in an educa-
tional institution, but do not see education as something that they are
particularly concerned about except when it comes time to make
speeches. Lacking a vision for the university, some administrators
become bureaucrats mindlessly pursuing specific programs without con-
sidering how those programs fit into some overall vision; others become
crisis managers, handling specific problems as they arise and losing inter-
est once the political pressure to do something about the problem passes.
A. The "Base Rate" Problem
This characterization of the problem rests on some inferences about
what has been happening on campus, and I doubt that I can make the
case fully here. Some of the inferences can be drawn from the political
correctness literature, particularly from comments on administrators'
ineffective response to incidents of political correctness. There is, how-
ever, an important gap in the literature, known to social scientists as the
"base rate" problem. We really do not know how many problems arise
from liberal political correctness and how many from efforts by conserva-
tives to enforce their orthodoxy, and despite the claims in the newspapers
we certainly have no way of determining whether incidents of orthodoxy-
enforcement have occurred more frequently recently.
I can draw on my experience in the legal academy for two points about
the base rate. First, if the measure of orthodoxy-enforcement is denial of
tenure or nonrenewal of appointments, the problem of political correct-
ness pretty clearly arises from the right rather than from the left at many
universities.9"
Second, and more important here, the population of law students
today exercised about deviations from liberal orthodoxy is almost cer-
tainly no larger than the population exercised by deviations from con-
servative orthodoxy." Teaching some aspects of constitutional law-
notably, affirmative action and abortion-is like walking through a mine
field. An instructor who articulates firmly held views on these subjects
either way will inevitably offend a substantial segment of the class.
Worse, an instructor who tries to suggest that the issues raised by affirm-
ative action or abortion are more complicated than either liberal or con-
servative orthodoxy will satisfy almost no one. I should stress, though,
94. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 8, which enumerates adverse personnel decisions about people
associated with the left. I do not believe that a similarly long list could be compiled of people
associated with the right who suffered adverse personnel decisions.
95. Part of the reason for the concern about deviations from conservatism may be peculiar to law
schools. Most law students come into law school as naive positivists, and many end that way. They
believe that whatever the courts and legislature articulate as the law must for that reason be correct,
and anyone who criticizes the present state of the law must be doing so for merely political reasons.
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that in this form the difficulties present only a pedagogic problem--or
opportunity, if one is optimistic. Few instructors are likely to get across
the mine field unscathed, though: student visits to the associate dean,
letters to the student newspaper, public letters, and the like may well
occur. To the extent that these actions make a teacher's life more diffi-
cult, as Macneil's account shows they do, they impair the teacher's abil-
ity to teach.
Note, however, that the threat to effective pedagogy, at least in consti-
tutional law, comes from both, or all, sides of the political spectrum.
That is why, in my view, the real problem cannot be attributed to par-
tisans of particular political viewpoints. It must be found in the ordinary
operation of universities as institutions.
B. Orthodoxy in Institutional Self-Definition
The problem must be narrowed even more, for there are situations in
which even a secular college or department might properly enforce a cer-
tain kind of orthodoxy.96 Some political science departments, for exam-
ple, are Straussian. They find it easy to hire someone who can refer in an
off-handed footnote to "the less thoughtful egalitarianism and socialism
of Eastern academe as expressed in the works of men like Professors
Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Michael Walzer,"97 a statement that,
despite its charming loopiness, would be disqualifying in other depart-
ments. An economics department striving to gain a national reputation
might notice that there is an open niche in the market for a department
that concentrates in blending Austrian and Marxist economics, and
might deliberately refuse to hire superbly qualified neo-classicists.
Everyone involved in academic hiring knows that faculties make deci-
sions like these all the time, at least in the sense that these factors influ-
ence choice on the margin (which, as I noted earlier, is where all choice
occurs). No decent theory of academic freedom could condemn such
decisions, even though in an important sense people are denied jobs on
political or ideological grounds.98 Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued
96. I put aside the special questions raised by church-related institutions that impose a religious
orthodoxy, which may also be political in some of its dimensions, on students and faculty. For a
slightly out-of-focus discussion, see Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges
and Universities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303 (Summer 1990). The discussion is out-of-focus
because it is structured as a criticism of the position taken by the American Association of
University Professors, that institutions which restrict academic freedom in certain ways ought not be
entitled to claim that they are real colleges. To which the proper response ought to be, So what?
McConnell does explain, however, the values served by allowing religious institutions to impose
orthodoxy on students and faculty, which is different from explaining why such institutions ought to
be called colleges and universities.
97. Broyles, Partisans of Federalism, in E PLURIBUS UNUM: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 261 n.29 (Sarah B. Thurow ed., 1988).
98. I distinguish the two, although in many cases there is such a high correlation between
ideology and politics-there are, I think, almost no Straussians located on the traditional left-wing
(although some Straussians define others, who are insufficiently conservative, as left-wing)-that
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that the theory of academic freedom should permit these decisions when
they result from good faith consideration of professionally relevant fac-
tors, such as institutional need and mission.99 The difficulty, of course, is
that all parts of the political spectrum sometimes try to enforce their
views without the requisite good faith.
Once we see that the problem is bad faith, though, its contours shift.
For, though it is easy to see how small groups or departments might act
in bad faith, it is harder to understand how it comes about that the col-
lege or university as a whole stands back and lets that bad faith action
take effect. To do so, we have to consider how universities operate.
C. Administrators as Bureaucrats and Crisis Managers
Macneil found the "administration and faculty response" to his situa-
tion "of particular interest." Faculty colleagues "made private support-
ive comments." An administrator "offered administration 'help' several
times-surely in an effort to smooth the waters rather than to face the
issues." The administration, that is, did not affirmatively do anything
wrong. In Macneil's view, what was wrong was that the administration
did not do anything to "recognize[ ] publicly the dangers to academic
freedom of the politicized classroom that the Women's Law Association
seeks to impose on faculty and students alike."'"
The theme of administrative inaction in the face of threats to academic
freedom is pervasive. An example from the other side of the political
spectrum is instructive. Professor Sally Sedgwick of the Dartmouth phi-
losophy department was the object of a scurrilous campaign against her
by the Dartmouth Review. The Review mobilized supporters outside the
college to place pressure on Sedgwick and the college, erroneously
reporting that she had accused a member of the Review's staff of plagia-
rism because he disagreed with her political positions."°' According to
Andrew Bowers, who reported the story, "throughout" the period,
"Sedgwick waited for Dartmouth President James 0. Freedman to speak
out on her behalf. Instead, his office sent the professor a bunch of
roses.... Privately, the administration was telling her that she had acted
properly. Publicly, it made no such statement." The episode ended
when the administration reduced the sanction imposed on the student for
inadequately footnoting his research paper from a two-term suspension
to a one-term suspension; the student agreed not to sue the college. "An
administration source said that Dartmouth had acted out of compassion"
faculties might well be skeptical about the ideological credentials of a candidate who held the
"wrong" political views.
99. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 155
(Summer 1990).
100. Macneil, supra note 18, at 11.
101. For what appears to be a full account, see Andrew Bowers, Politics and Pedagogy at
Dartmouth, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 1991, at 22.
[Vol. 4:127
30
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss1/6
Tushnet
to alleviate the strain on the student. "Sedgwick, for her part, wonders
how much concern there was for her." Finally, "three months after the
affair began," the dean of faculty distributed a statement saying that
Sedgwick "did exactly what she should have done," but tempered that
statement by expressing concern about the faculty's rules regarding pla-
giarism and failure to footnote adequately.
The Sedgwick incident has most of the characteristics of the political
correctness problem even though it involves a right-wing attack. The
difficulty is not that university administrations fail, in the end, to do the
right thing; rather, the difficulty is that it takes them too long to do it,
and even then their response is often qualified by inappropriate conces-
sions to ideologues."°2 That, in my view, is the real political correctness
problem."03 Why does it happen?
The usual story is embodied in the title of Roger Kimball's Tenured
Radicals. 1  The most active members of today's faculties were, as I was,
students in the 1960s and, the story goes, continue to hold the radical
values we adopted then. Now, having access to institutional power as
faculty members, we enforce political correctness. Yet, if the problem is
administrative inaction, that story cannot be correct. For, even if we are
now influential members of the faculty, we are not administrators: James
Freedman was not a student radical; when Harvard's alumni magazine
proffled the university's new president, its story opened with an anecdote
showing how "responsibly" he had behaved during the student turmoil
of the 1960s;105 and Robert Clark, dean of Harvard Law School during
the Macneil incident, is well-known for being unsympathetic personally
to the left.' °6
Administrators are slow to act, then, not because they agree with the
attacks on faculty members or students.107 They are slow, in part,
because they are bureaucrats, who follow the rules no matter what the
circumstances. They also follow the rules in part out of deference to
102. The Macneil incident is different in form (and, I have argued, in substance as well, to the
extent that the HWLA letter was not aimed at "politicizing the classroom" but was aimed at
Macneil's inappropriate pedagogy). Because Macneil was a visiting professor, a delayed response by
the administration amounted to no response at all, which is probably what the administration
wanted in the first place, for reasons discussed in text accompanying notes 111-12 infra.
103. For a similar perspective, offered in the heightened tone of his polemical writings, see
Genovese, supra note 53.
104. ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: How POLrICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER
EDUCATION (1990).
105. Lambert, Renaissance President, HARVARD MAGAZINE, May-June 1991, at 31.
106. I am reasonably confident that, given complete freedom to take sides, Freedman would
have agreed with Sedgwick on the merits. I am less confident that, given similar freedom, Clark
would have sided with Macneil, because, as I have argued, Macneil's defense of his actions on the
merits was not persuasive (and because I believe that Clark's position would be determined
substantially by his assessment of the merits).
107. The analysis in the remainder of this section has a more speculative aspect than what has
gone before, in large measure because, although I am a faculty member and have, I believe, a
reasonably good sense of faculty culture, I am not an administrator and am less confident about my
sense of that culture.
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faculty autonomy. For example, when the Bennington English depart-
ment acted inappropriately in refusing to renew Edward Hoagland's con-
tract,"'8 the college's president did not simply jump in and reverse the
decision; she referred it to the campus academic freedom committee for
investigation and report. When events are unambiguous, perhaps admin-
istrators ought to forgo the ordinary mechanisms of review. But, unhap-
pily, events are rarely unambiguous except to the victims and their
tormentors. In a world filled with ambiguity, we have to worry about
authorizing administrators to iritervene promptly when they conclude
that events were unambiguous; sometimes they will find things clear
when they were actually unclear, and the campus climate might then be
even chillier than it is when administrators always wait for the routine
mechanisms of review to kick in.
That is the generous account of what happens to slow down the public
presentation of the right response to student or faculty misbehavior.
Bureaucracy, though, can cause another kind of problem. University
administrators delegate a lot of their functions to units like affirmative
action offices, which take their specialized missions single-mindedly.
Consider what happens when a hate-speech regulation is proposed.
Because such regulations are generated at least in part by pressure from
minority students and faculty and their sympathizers, an administrator
might well assign the job of developing the regulations, or writing a pam-
phlet explaining them, to the affirmative action office. That guarantees
trouble. The affirmative action office will try to extend the reach of the
regulations as far as it can, disregarding any contrary free expression
concerns." 9 Nor can central offices like the chancellor's or provost's be
counted on to tone down the regulations. They may not pay attention
carefully enough. More important, though, what the separate specialized
offices develop can be melded into a coherent educational program only if
the chancellor, provost, or president actually has such a program, or
thinks it a good thing to try to develop one. That, however, is precisely
what administrators who see their jobs as merely political lack.
As this analysis suggests, though bureaucracy is certainly part of the
story, there is much more. For, university administrators are not only
bureaucrats; they are crisis managers as well. Today's administrators are
indeed children of the 1960s, but they were not the radicals on campus;
they were the centrists. They learned their lessons about politics from
John Kennedy and their lessons about universities from Clark Kerr, the
former president of the University of California who clearly articulated
108. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
109. That appears to have been what happened at the University of Michigan, where the
affirmative action office wrote a set of explanations of the hate-speech regulations that extended their
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the view that the modem university was simply a political enterprise and
then failed as a politician."' Seeing the university as a political enter-
prise, administrators see their job as accommodating the conflicting pres-
sures they feel from all sorts of constituencies, inside and outside the
university. The best of them hope that, once all the pressures are diffused
and set against each other, they will have some freedom to move the
university in some particular direction. But, they tend to believe that
their freedom is quite constrained, and that most of what they do
involves keeping the university on course, not developing some distinc-
tive educational mission.
How, then, do politicians and crisis managers respond to political cor-
rectness problems? First, they move slowly. Macneil found that the
HWLA letter absorbed an "incredible amount of [his] time and psychic
energy."1 1' But, while the events were surely the most important thing
happening to him at the time, they almost certainly were much less
important to the administration. Macneil was going to leave Harvard in
a few months anyway, and the administration could reasonably expect
that most people would have forgotten the events by the fall.
Strikingly, administrators have-reason to delay even when the charges
are frivolous. They know that, in the main, precisely because the charges
are frivolous, at the end of the day nothing is going to come of them.
When students bring the charges, administrators know that the students
will graduate, or will find another atrocity to protest next semester." 2
As politicians, administrators find it senseless to buy trouble today by
trying to explain in the heat of controversy that one side was clearly right
and the other clearly wrong, when they know that tomorrow or-as in
Sedgwick's case-three months later the explanation will go down
smoothly.
After delay, the administrator's second response is compromise. Fac-
ing diverse pressures from students, alumni, politicians, the media, fed-
eral bureaucrats, and many others, administrators believe that the most
sensible short-term strategy is to buy off as many pressures as they can.
If they can give in to one constituency without seriously offending
another, they will. When students criticize a professor, the easiest course
for the administrator is to do nothing. The students publish the student
newspaper; the professor has many fewer resources to make political
trouble for the administration.
The managerial mind-set originated in what was perceived as a trans-
formation in the university's role in the years after 1945. The radical
110. See CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (1963). For a discussion of Kerr's
failure at the managerial task, see W.J. RORBAUGH, BERKELEY AT WAR: THE 1960s, at 10-40
(1989).
111. Macneil, supra note 18, at 10.
112. The Sedgwick incident is different precisely because the Dartmouth Review's successful
efforts at mobilizing outside support mean that the episode is much less likely to blow over.
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students of the 1960s argued that the multiversity had become
politicized. As they saw it, universities had abandoned their mission of
disinterested truth-seeking to serve the immediate interests of the polit-
ical interest groups of the larger society. 113 The argument then devel-
oped in two divergent directions. First, a Marxist-influenced strand,
confident that the disinterested pursuit of truth would liberate the
oppressed, tried to restore what it presented as the university's tradi-
tional mission, that is, to "de-politicize" it. Second, a strand that I asso-
ciate with populism and progressivism tried to shift the political direction
of the university, to "re-politicize" it in the correct way.
114
Neither direction proved terribly effective, but the restorationist effort
failed sooner and more dramatically." 5 The restorationists were com-
mitted to acknowledging the possibility that people they disagreed with
politically might still have found out something true; their mind-set, that
is, was incompatible with the oppositionist tenor of much radicalism.
Further, the restorationists faced a difficult rhetorical task. They had to
show that some of their opponents were falsely claiming to be engaged in
the disinterested pursuit of truth when they really were pursuing a polit-
ical agenda. By engaging in such an argument, the restorationists had a
"baseline" problem; the argument was over where to find the proper
baseline of the disinterested pursuit of truth, and such arguments are
notoriously difficult to win. The people they opposed claimed to be pur-
suing truth while, as they put it, the restorationists were trying to politi-
cize the university. This problem was exacerbated by the Marxist
element in the restorationist camp, because, in the political culture of the
United States, to say that someone is a Marxist is precisely to say that he
or she is not interested in the pursuit of truth.
The populist-progressive camp, in contrast, had a somewhat easier
time. As Marxism was discredited, that camp offered the only alterna-
tive to what all on the left agreed was a university politicized in the
wrong way. Also, it was able to ride post-Marxist currents of European
social thought that argued that all scholarship was political. These cur-
rents made it possible for "re-politicizers" to ignore their opponents'
scholarship, but, more important, they also displaced the argument
113. The language of "abandonment" suggests that universities once had, but recently lost, the
disinterested mission. Some radical students did not make that historical claim, but argued that
universities, whatever they had been and were, ought to pursue truth disinterestedly.
114. I am unaware of a comprehensive history of these developments. PETER NovicK, THAT
NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBjECrIVITY" QUESTION AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION
(1988), provides essential background, but as it reaches the 1960s its analysis becomes increasingly
sketchy.
115. I think it important to note that, in history, the field with which I am most familiar, the
Marxist-influenced restorationists, Eugene Genovese and Sean Wilentz, are among the most
important and productive scholars, which makes the attack on "political correctness" particularly
misplaced. These scholars would be happy to see the university taken out of politics; some, however,
believe that it is already so deeply implicated in politics that a determined attack on the political
character of the university is essential.
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entirely. If all scholarship was political, it could not be a criticism of
their work--or of anyone's-that it was not neutral or apolitical.
In its best form, represented for example by Stanley Fish, this line of
argument leads to genial tolerance of the tolerant. The only point it
needs to make is that adherents of traditional scholarship ought not rule
new forms of scholarship out of bounds by arguing that proponents of
the new forms are trying to "politicize" the university. On populist-pro-
gressive argument, the university is always already politicized, and the
populist-progressive camp is simply trying to get in the door.
At this point, the interests of the "re-politicizers" and administrators
as managers came into line. Not that administrators welcomed the re-
politicizers, who, after all, did disrupt systems of administrative behavior
that had settled into place. Rather, the re-politicizers were people
administrators could deal with, as the restorationists were not. The
restorationists rejected the administrators' characteristic way of think-
ing---compromise and balance-in favor of a vision of the university as a
place where disinterested scholars pursued the truth. The re-politicizers,
in contrast, simply wanted to bargain with everyone else over dividing
the university's goods. And, for a while, they did reasonably well in the
bargaining process.
Yet, the strategies of delay and compromise, though sensible in the
short run, can cause trouble in the long run. Other constituencies, par-
ticularly those outside the university, can start to bring pressure on the
administration. Indeed, seen politically, that is precisely what the attack
on political correctness is: the mobilization of outside forces to put polit-
ical pressure on university administrations." I6 It seems significant in this
connection that Benno Schmidt, the president of Yale University and a
man of the liberal-left, responded to the political correctness controversy
by calling the criticisms "substantial."" ' 7 If I were Dinesh D'Souza,
though, I would not wait a long time hoping to notice differences in
Yale's behavior." 8
Schmidt's statement, indeed, may be typical. Sophisticated adminis-
trators, those who become presidents of major universities, give half a
loaf to each side. Instead of changing policies, they issue statements.
And, in doing so, they point out to both sides that, if they continue to
complain, the other side will get even more upset. And, when that hap-
116. For an articulate presentation of this point, see the remarks of Stanley Fish on the
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, (PBS television broadcast, June 19, 1991) (Transcript #4058 available
on NEXIS).
117. Yale Chief Decries 'Politically Correct'Limits on Speech, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1991, at A28.
118. Yale, though, may present a special case, because Donald Kagan, dean of Yale College, has
been a prominent supporter of the political correctness attack. See, e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour,
(PBS television broadcast, June 20, 1991) (Transcript #4059 available on NEXIS). But see Alex
Beam, The Fall of Yale's Poster Child, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 1991, at A17 (reporting "depth of
anti-Kagan feelings" at faculty meeting).
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pens, the implicit threat is, the university will have to respond to the
greater pressure, which will make the complainers worse off than ever.
V. CONCLUSION
Critics of political correctness believe that universities have become
politicized. Ordinarily, that means that universities are bastions of lib-
eral orthodoxy. There is a small grain of truth to that. Conservatism has
prevailed in virtually all the society's major institutions, but it has not yet
taken over the universities. To suggest that the remedy for "politicizing"
the universities is to politicize them differently, though, is a little
peculiar.
The political correctness controversy ironically confirms the analysis
students offered in the 1960s. Political correctness problems arise
because university administrators have no real sense of what their institu-
tions ought to be doing, aside from accommodating political pressures.
And, the political correctness controversy itself became just another
source of political trouble for university administrators, something to be
"handled."
Under these circumstances, it seems almost fruitless for a non-admin-
istrator to advance a vision of "the university"; what I have to say, as a
member of a faculty, will inevitably be taken by those in positions of
power merely as another claim by a member of a pressure group. And,
in light of what I have already said, what I can contribute to developing a
vision of "the university" is quite limited in any event. For, when all is
said and done, what we need are administrators who have a vision of the
university-any vision at all. 119
I have argued that there are two dimensions on which universities
ought to take a position: the degree to which they take their mission to
include the moral formation of their students, and the degree to which
they are committed to the pursuit of disinterested scholarship (acknowl-
edging that today the idea that scholarship can be disinterested is itself
contested). In a society with many, potentially diverse institutions of
higher education, what we need are universities that forthrightly take a
position along these dimensions. Some could decide to take an extremely
active role in moral formation; they might then adopt stringent "hate
speech" codes. Others could decide to leave moral formation to other
119. The examples come to mind of institutions whose administrators do have a vision-
Hillsdale College on the right, New College of Law on the left-are small ones. Perhaps the large
multiversities are so far removed from being able to fulfill the classical ideal of the university that we
cannot expect more vision from their managers. A university manager who tried to implement a
vision might bring the university to a halt. Yet, if that is true, I wonder what the premise of the
attack on "political correctness" could possibly be; certainly, on this assumption, one could not
reasonably expect a university administrator to try to restore the university to its pre-multiversity
state. If the major Catholic universities like Georgetown ever make the transition to multiversity
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institutions; they might then treat their campuses as free fire free speech
zones. What matters, though, is that, once the institutions have taken a
position, they defend it vigorously and without embarrassment as
embodying a permissible vision of the university in contemporary
society. 120
This course is unlikely to be easy. Opportunists and careerists within
and outside the university, and ignoramuses on the right and the left, will
surely attack any institution that takes a position with which they disa-
gree. And, as we have seen, precisely because many positions on the
issues of moral formation and disinterested scholarship are defensible,
these attacks can be formulated in intellectually respectable terms. The
correct response to them, though, should be, "If you don't like the way
we do things here, go somewhere else."
Despite some hopeful statements,' 2I I find little in the discussions of
political correctness to suggest that the controversy's outcome will be a
new commitment within the university to the disinterested pursuit of
truth. The issue has been hijacked by a particular political tendency, and
there is little reason to believe that many people on either the left or the
right will find it profitable to try to rescue it.
In writing this essay I have been reminded of Joseph Haennig, a
French lawyer who wrote an article during the Vichy regime arguing
that Nazi statutes defining who was a Jew ought to be construed nar-
rowly.' 22 Richard Weisberg, who brought Haennig to our attention,
notes the moral dilemma he was in. To argue that the statutes should be
construed narrowly might save the lives and property of some Jews. To
argue about how the statutes should be construed, though, was to partici-
pate in a vicious system, if only as a matter of necessity. So too, I have
felt, about participating in the discussion of political correctness. Not
that the critics of "political correctness" are in the same moral category
as Henri Petain, but they have structured a discussion on premises that
are so removed from moral and empirical reality that it is problematic to
engage in the discussion at all.1
23
120. I would make the same argument about the disinterested pursuit of scholarship: universities
should determine their position on the contested question of whether such a pursuit is possible, and
then develop personnel and other policies compatible with that position.
121. See especially Genovese, supra note 53.
122. See R.WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FIcTIoN, 1 (1984).
123. And, I think, with less justification than Haennig, who, if he was to act as a lawyer at all,
had to act within the system as it was (and who may have been trying to save lives).
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